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THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREGNANT DRUG-
USING WOMEN AS CRIMINAL PERPETRATORS 
Nancy D. Campbell
“[W]hat the law tells us to do is not as important as what the law tells us 
to be.”
* 
1
Despite clear lack of intent to harm those whom they carry, drug-using 
pregnant women have been constructed as de facto criminal perpetrators.  
When women become noticeably unable or unwilling to carry out their 
assigned social roles and responsibilities as parents, they have often been 
demonized as “bad mothers,” and criminalized.
 
2  Women of color who live 
with poverty have been disproportionately affected by criminalization,3 
which reinforces the view that they are “undeserving” of the right to 
procreate.4  Casting pregnant drug users as intentionally harming the 
fetuses they carry, feticide convictions rest upon the attribution of reckless 
indifference, “a conscious failure to exercise due care or ordinary care or a 
conscious indifference to the rights and safety of others or a reckless 
disregard thereof.”5
 
*Assistant Professor, Department of Science and Technology Studies, Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute. 
  Drug use, I argue, falls short of being prima facie 
evidence of intent to harm, particularly in social circumstances where drug-
using economies are endemic.  Drug use is highly likely in the social and 
 1. CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN’S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE POLITICS OF 
FETAL RIGHTS 100 (1993). 
 2. See, e.g., Julia E. Hanigsberg & Sara Ruddick, Introduction, in MOTHER TROUBLES: 
RETHINKING CONTEMPORARY MATERNAL DILEMMAS ix-x (Julia E. Hanigsberg & Sara 
Ruddick eds., 1999) (discussing the notion of “bad mothers”); Molly Ladd-Taylor & Laurie 
Umanksy, Introduction, in “BAD” MOTHERS: THE POLITICS OF BLAME IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 2 (Molly Ladd-Taylor & Laurie Umansky eds., 1998) (“[T]hroughout 
the twentieth century, the label of ‘bad’ mother has been applied to far more women than 
those whose actions would warrant the name.”). 
 3. See Rachel Roth, The Perils of Pregnancy: Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 10 
FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 150, 152 (2002) (stating that women have been charged with drug 
crimes based on a single positive urine test after giving birth to their babies, while “the 
Charleston police department has never arrested a male patient and charged him with 
possessing drugs on the basis of a positive urine test”). 
 4. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, 
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1444 (1991). 
 5. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 173 (S.C. 2003). 
CAMPBELL_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:12 PM 
102 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXIII 
economic circumstances of the vast majority of defendants in these cases, 
which follow the contours of the localized political geography of illicit 
drug use in the United States.6
Congressional hearings on maternal crack-cocaine use during the late 
1980s and early 1990s elucidate the motives behind state and federal 
attempts to penalize illicit drug use by pregnant women.
  It is difficult if not impossible to maintain 
that drug-taking is a conscious act intended to harm a fetus.  The cases I 
examine in this article signal the limits of tolerance and the increasingly 
conditional nature of public welfare provision by raising the specter of a 
generation of urban mothers—and grandmothers—unable to care for their 
kids.  These cases also reflect the policy-making role into which hospitals 
and the courts have stepped in the face of a legislative void. 
7  Women’s rights 
advocates opposed the principle of criminalization behind these hearings, 
arguing instead for increased health care access through drug treatment 
tailored to the specific circumstances of pregnant women.8  The hearings 
defined the problem as a decline in maternal instinct9 that had rendered 
urban drug-using women “unable to manage their childcare 
responsibilities.”10  Urban women’s maternal incapacity placed a novel 
strain upon social services because “mothers and grandmothers could no 
longer care for the escalating numbers of drug exposed infants.”11
 
 6. For a compelling argument concerning the concentration of risk and vulnerability in 
core urban areas of the United States, see KEVIN FITZPATRICK & MARK LAGORY, 
UNHEALTHY PLACES: THE ECOLOGY OF RISK IN THE URBAN LANDSCAPE 168-76 (2000). 
  If the 
burning question of social policy was—“who should absorb the costs of 
 7. See, e.g., Falling Through the Crack: The Impact of Drug-Exposed Children on the 
Child Welfare System: Hearing on S. 101-846 Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, 
Drugs & Alcoholism of the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 101st Cong. (1990) 
(discussing the resources devoted to children born to mothers who used drugs during 
pregnancy); Impact of Crack Cocaine on the Child Welfare System: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 101st Cong. (1990); 
Born Hooked: Confronting the Impact of Perinatal Substance Abuse: Hearing Before the H. 
Select Comm. on Children, Youth, & Families, 101st Cong. (1989). 
 8. Advocacy was quite effective in California, where the prosecution of Pamela Rae 
Stewart galvanized a coalition that successfully resisted criminalization.  See LAURA E. 
GÓMEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS, AND THE POLITICS OF 
PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE 41-62 (1997). 
 9. See Nancy D. Campbell, Regulating “Maternal Instinct”: Governing Mentalities of 
Late Twentieth Century U.S. Illicit Drug Policy, 24 SIGNS 895, 895 (1999) [hereinafter 
Campbell, Regulating “Maternal Instinct”] (“Policy makers announced the erosion of 
‘maternal instinct’ in the thick of the crack cocaine crisis in the late 1980s.”). 
 10. Impact of Drugs on Children and Families: Hearing on S. 101-397 Before the S. 
Comm. on Labor & Human Res. and the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 25 (1989) 
(quoting the testimony of Reed Tuckson, D.C. Commissioner of Public Health). 
 11. See NANCY D. CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN: GENDER, DRUG POLICY, AND SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 185 (2000) [hereinafter CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN]. 
CAMPBELL_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:12 PM 
2006] DRUG-USING WOMEN 103 
social reproduction?”12—the answer was that drug-using mothers clearly 
could not.13  These Congressional hearings highlighted the fear that drug-
using women would shift their burdens to the state.14
Long used as a potent metaphor for social decline, the figure of the 
addicted woman encodes compulsion without control, the failures of self-
governance, and the overwhelming power of illegitimate desires and 
insatiable needs.  Yet, our view of individual parental responsibility stems 
from the notion that only those who can govern themselves are “fit” to 
govern others.  Despite their marginalization, addicted women have been 
held individually accountable by zealous prosecutors for pregnancy 
“outcomes” over which they have little control.
 
15  Pregnancy outcomes 
have come under scrutiny as states have found compelling interests in fetal 
life and death.  Fetal rights proponents owe their momentum to the anti-
abortion movement, which strategically salted “the unborn” in numerous 
policy arenas ranging from child health insurance to separate penalties for 
the violent assault of a fetus.16  While prosecutions of pregnant drug-using 
women may seem separate from the abortion debate, they have galvanized 
both the pro-prosecution anti-abortionists and the anti-prosecution 
feminists, civil libertarians, and clinicians who counter them.17  A flurry of 
legislative activity in the 1990s yielded widespread recognition that drug 
treatment for pregnant women was largely unavailable.18
 
 12. As a nation we are in a remarkably deep state of denial about who does absorb these 
costs and the toll it takes on those that do.  Women’s unpaid labor remains the “hidden cost” 
of social reproduction, and it is contextualized within the continued undervaluation of 
women’s paid and unpaid labor, coupled with the construction of motherhood as itself a 
form of social service.  Poor women are forced into the low-wage labor market, despite the 
oft-noted lack of adequate and affordable child care, health insurance, and other supports 
necessary to sustain their labor-force participation.  For documentation on the extent to 
which women continue to absorb more than their share of these costs, see NANCY FOLBRE, 
WHO PAYS FOR THE KIDS? GENDER AND THE STRUCTURES OF CONSTRAINT (1994). 
  Advocates led 
 13. For an article that makes this point clearly in reference to the prosecutorial trends 
under discussion, see Shalini Bhargava, Challenging Punishment and Privatization: A 
Response to the Conviction of Regina McKnight, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 513 (2004). 
 14. See CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN, supra note 11, at 185 (“[W]omen are no longer fit or 
willing to absorb the tasks and costs of social reproduction.”). 
 15. On the prosecutorial role, see GÓMEZ, supra note 8, at 63-91. 
 16. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 
(2004) (providing for the protection of unborn children). 
 17. Lynn M. Paltrow, The War on Drugs and the War on Abortion: Some Initial 
Thoughts on the Connections, Intersections and the Effects, 28 S.U. L. REV. 201 (2001) 
[hereinafter Paltrow, The War on Drugs and the War on Abortion]. 
 18. On the variety of legislative activities in one state (California), see GÓMEZ, supra 
note 8, at 28-29 (“Between 1986 and 1996, California lawmakers introduced 57 bills 
concerning prenatal drug exposure. . . . Before 1986, not a single legislative proposal had 
even mentioned drug use during pregnancy.”). 
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policy makers to understand the well documented inability of the drug 
treatment system to treat pregnant women.  By 1992, the crack epidemic 
had faded,19 and legislative and prosecutorial energy declined in most 
locales.  State supreme courts rejected the use of existing child abuse and 
neglect statutes—or creative charges such as the delivery of controlled 
substances to babies through the umbilical cord20—and did not take kindly 
to the fact that laws intended to curb drug trafficking were being twisted to 
another purpose.  When the Supreme Court of Florida overturned Jennifer 
Johnson’s drug trafficking conviction in 1992,21 it joined similar decisions, 
acquittals, or dismissals in other states.22  Even in South Carolina, where 
prosecutorial energy did not decline, the legislature did not explicitly 
criminalize illicit drug use during pregnancy, despite open encouragement 
from the South Carolina Supreme Court in the Whitner decision.23
South Carolina, however, has persisted in an ongoing effort to reverse 
the direction of this trajectory by placing behavioral conditions upon 
pregnant women, requiring cross-reporting between criminal justice and 
health care settings, and using health care settings to gain access to 
  Thus, 
courts tended to treat substance abuse during pregnancy as a public health 
matter rather than one requiring criminal penalties. 
 
 19. CRAIG REINARMAN & HARRY G. LEVINE, CRACK IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 42-43 (1997). 
 20. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding 
that an adult mother violated the statutory prohibition against the delivery of controlled 
substances to minors by taking “cocaine into her pregnant body and caus[ing] the passage of 
that cocaine to each of her children through the umbilical cord after birth of the child”). 
 21. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); see also Gómez, supra note 8, at 79.  
The Florida District Court of Appeals has found that Johnson violated a statutory 
prohibition against the delivery of controlled substance to minors by passing cocaine to her 
fetus through the umbilical cord, Johnson, 578 So. 2d at 420, but the Florida Supreme Court 
overturned this decision, finding that: 
[w]hile unhealthy behavior cannot be condoned, to bring criminal charges against 
a pregnant woman for activities which may be harmful to her fetus is 
inappropriate.  Such prosecution is counterproductive to the public interest as it 
may discourage a woman from seeking prenatal care or dissuade her from 
providing accurate information to health care providers out of fear of self-
incrimination. 
Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1296. 
 22. For example, the Pamela Rae Stewart case attracted national attention.  See Fetus 
Abuse?; Against Doctor’s Orders, TIME MAG., Oct. 13, 1986, at 81; Andrea Sachs, Here 
Comes the Pregnancy Police; Mothers of Drug-Exposed Infants Face Legal Punishment, 
TIME MAG., May 22, 1989, at 104.  Cases elsewhere include State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).  For an 
exhaustive list of cases, see Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the 
Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1004 n.17 (1999). 
 23. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778-84 (S.C. 1997).  For a further discussion of 
Whitner, see infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text. 
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evidence for criminal prosecutions.24  Drug-tested as the result of a stealth 
protocol set up in 1989 at the Medical University of South Carolina 
(MUSC) in Charleston, South Carolina, Crystal Ferguson and her co-
defendants neither knew about nor consented to the tests.25  Over its five-
year life, the MUSC program directly impacted thirty women who were 
arrested and charged with possession or distribution of cocaine, or child 
neglect.26  Advocates vigorously attacked the motivations of program staff, 
the underlying perceptions of “crack babies” and the “crack-cocaine crisis” 
that contributed to their motivations, and the lack of drug treatment 
capacity for women in the region.  They raised constitutional questions 
concerning MUSC’s “human subjects research.”27  They also circulated 
stories that suggested racial targeting had occurred, despite a 1991 study 
showing that only 0.79% of South Carolina women tested positive for 
cocaine when they gave birth.28  While pregnancy has been used to 
abrogate rights and increase social control,29
 
 24. See Heather Flynn Bell, Comment, In Utero Endangerment and Public Health: 
Prosecution vs. Treatment, 36 TULSA L. J. 649, 671-72 (2001). 
 the experience of Crystal 
If we begin interpreting statutes regarding child endangerment to include all 
viable fetuses, as was the case in Whitner v. State, it could lead to prosecution of 
parents for acts that are legal but might endanger the child’s well-being, including 
smoking or the consumption of alcohol. . . . ‘[N]o woman can provide the perfect 
womb, [and] prosecution for prenatal drug use could possibly open the door for 
any variety of activities during their pregnancy . . . .’ 
Id. at 671-73. 
 25. See Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 (2001); see also Gómez, supra note 8, 
at 79-80. 
 26. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 103. 
 27. Mary Faith Marshall et al., Perinatal Substance Abuse and Human Subjects 
Research: Are Privacy Protections Adequate?, 9 MENTAL RETARDATION & 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RES. REVS. 54, 54 (2003). 
In 1993, while [MUSC’s] policy was in effect, the former Office of Protection 
from Research Risks, the federal office with oversight authority for compliance 
with regulations governing federally funded human subjects research determined 
that investigators at the Medical University of South Carolina had performed 
research on the plaintiffs without their informed consent.  The Medical 
University’s multiple project assurance was put on hold until corrective actions 
were taken. 
Id. 
 28. Kimani Paul-Emile, The Charleston Policy: Substance or Abuse?, 4 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 325, 353 (1999) (citing a study by the South Carolina State Council on maternal, 
infant, and child health). 
 29. See DANIELS, supra note 1, at 6 (“[T]his process of ‘going public’ has both 
empowered women and drawn them into more subtle and complex mechanisms of social 
control.”); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE 
MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997) [hereinafter ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY]; LAURA R. 
WOLIVER, THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIES OF PREGNANCY 141 (2002) (“[P]unishing drug 
addicts who choose to carry their pregnancies to term burdens the constitutional right to 
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Ferguson and her co-defendants resulted from a set of social exclusions and 
dehumanizing assumptions that transcend the circumstances of this case.  
Yet the United States Supreme Court responded with a ruling in Ferguson 
v. Charleston that was but a narrow victory for reproductive rights 
advocates.30  As Birgitte Nahas noted, the Court never reached the 
questions of the constitutionality of South Carolina’s characterization of the 
viable fetus as a person,31 or of mandatory child abuse reporting laws.32  
The Court ruled that testing pregnant women for drugs without their 
knowledge or consent constituted unlawful searches and seizures in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.33
Pregnancy outcome, of course, is determined by many conditions that 
transcend individual circumstances and affect wider populations, including 
poverty and lack of access to nutrition and health care.  Yet, it is difficult to 
argue that policies granting fetal rights and rendering women’s rights 
conditional will negatively affect women as a class, because these policies 
target individual drug-using women.  Although there is very little social 
gain in prosecuting female drug users, that may be beside the point.  
Feminist political scientists Cynthia Daniels and Rachel Roth suggest that 
such policies are a form of “symbolic vengeance” that send a symbolic 
message that some pregnant women threaten the social order.
  This ruling left South Carolina free 
to explore just how far it could go toward criminalizing women’s behavior 
during pregnancy by scrutinizing pregnancy outcome. 
34  The 
putative balance between fetal rights and women’s rights constructed by 
fetal rights advocates obscures the real conflict between women and the 
state.35
 
autonomy over reproductive decisions, helping to perpetuate a racist hierarchy in our 
society.”). 
  It makes it seem as if fetal rights are not contingent, conditional, or 
 30. 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 31. See Brigitte M. Nahas, Comment, Drug Tests, Arrests, and Fetuses: A Comment on 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Narrow Opinion in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 8 CARDOZO 
WOMEN’S L.J. 105, 141 (2001) (explaining how the majority “ducked” these issues).  The 
South Carolina State Supreme Court held that a viable fetus is a person in State v. Horne, 
319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984), and upheld a criminal neglect conviction in Whitner v. 
State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (S.C. 1997). 
 32. See Nahas, supra note 31, at 141. 
 33. Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86 (2001); see also Marshall et al., supra note 
27, at 54. 
 34. See DANIELS, supra note 1, at 117 (“The prosecution and incarceration of drug-
addicted pregnant women operates symbolically as retribution for the women’s 
transgressions.”); RACHEL ROTH, MAKING WOMEN PAY: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FETAL 
RIGHTS 15 (2000) (“Criminal trials in the United States often serve as a kind of public 
theater or modern-day morality play, and so it is right to point out this symbolic function.”). 
 35. On “fetal rights” generally, see DANIELS, supra note 1; Martha A. Field, Controlling 
the Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 114 (Summer 1989); Janet 
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contested, but rather are well established.  For this reason, Roth argues for 
recasting the conflict as one between pregnant women and the state: a 
“maternal-state conflict.”36
In Whitner v. State
 
37 and State v. McKnight,38 South Carolina courts 
upheld individual women’s convictions.  These cases illustrate how 
maternal-state conflicts play out in a “fetal rights” state.  Cornelia Whitner 
was convicted of criminal child neglect for ingesting cocaine during her 
third trimester; her healthy, now-teenage son tested positive for cocaine 
metabolites at birth.39  Regina McKnight, who sporadically used cocaine 
during her pregnancy and sought treatment for her drug use, delivered a 
stillborn child eight-and-a-half months into her pregnancy.40  She “became 
the first woman in America to be convicted of homicide by child abuse 
based on her behavior during pregnancy,” and was sentenced to twenty 
years in prison.41
Fetal rights law is reaching a state of maturity in a friendly political 
climate.  We see evidence of its “success” in the Unborn Victims of 
Violence Act of 2004
 
42 and the recent extension of child health insurance 
to unborn children.43
 
Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 9 (1987); Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts With 
Women’s Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 
(1986). 
  Fetal rights proponents have pushed to the extreme, 
 36. See ROTH, supra note 34, at 90 (“The expression ‘maternal-fetal conflict’ commonly 
used to describe these situations is a misnomer, but these cases certainly are about 
conflict—between women and medical authority and between women and state authority.”). 
 37. 492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (S.C. 1997) (holding that a state may impose additional 
penalties for pregnant women who engage in illegal conduct). 
 38. 576 S.E.2d 168, 179 (S.C. 2003) (affirming lower court conviction of a woman who 
gave birth to a stillborn baby because of drug abuse). 
 39. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 778-79.  Whitner served an eight-year sentence. 
 40. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 170-71; see also Lynn Paltrow, What Happened to Regina 
McKnight?, HARM REDUCTION COMM. (Harm Reduction Coalition, New York, N.Y.), 
Spring 2004 [hereinafter Paltrow, What Happened to Regina McKnight?], available at 
http://www.harmreduction.org/pubs/news/spring04/paltrow.html. 
 41. Paltrow, What Happened to Regina McKnight?, supra note 40, at 2 (noting also that 
the final eight years of McKnight’s sentence were suspended); see also McKnight v. South 
Carolina, 540 U.S. 819 (2003) (denying McKnight’s appeal). 
 42. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 
(2004). 
 43. Congress created the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in 1997 to 
address the growing number of children without healthcare.  See Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, Welcome to the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/about-SCHIP.asp (last viewed Dec. 2, 2005).  SCHIP 
provides coverage to “targeted low-income children.”  Id.  An unborn child now can qualify 
as a targeted low-income child by the State (and therefore be eligible for SCHIP) if other 
applicable State eligibility requirements are met.  See 42 C.F.R. § 457.10 (2005).  An 
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as shown by their use of fetal rights phrases such as “the ‘right’ of a mother 
to kill her children”44 or “addicted to abortion.”45  Although most states 
count a pregnant mother as a single citizen, fetal rights proponents have 
sought to create “two litigants” (the pregnant mother and her unborn 
child).46
if a woman possesses a constitutional right to kill her baby at any time 
during a pregnancy (and the United States Supreme Court has ruled that 
she does), then why should it matter that Ms. McKnight exercised her 
right by smoking crack as opposed to paying an abortionist to dismember 
and vacuum out her baby?  Indeed, Ms. McKnight did not set out to kill 
her unborn child—it was simply an unintended result of her smoking 
crack.  Why should she be sent to prison for doing negligently something 
which, if done intentionally, qualifies as a constitutional right?
  As one proponent argued in reference to McKnight, 
47
Intention mattered to this author: “in an abortion, unlike in a crack-smoking 
death, the mother does set ‘out to ‘intentionally harm her child.’”
 
48
Feticide laws sit uneasily with decriminalized abortion now that 
pregnant women themselves are charged and convicted under them.  State 
legislatures originally passed feticide laws to address third party harms to 
fetuses separate from third party harms to pregnant women.
 
49  Whitner v. 
State, however, widened the scope of South Carolina’s child neglect statute 
to include viable fetuses and served as precedent for State v. McKnight.50  
The Whitner Court held that viable fetuses have been considered “persons 
holding certain legal rights and privileges” within the state of South 
Carolina since the early 1960s.51
 
alternative would have been to extend universal coverage to pregnant women. 
  The court continued, “[o]nce the concept 
 44. Mark Trapp, Addicted to Abortion (June 18, 2001), 
http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0601abortion.htm (“[T]he South Carolina 
Advocates for Pregnant Women is nothing more than another pro-abortion group, willing to 
excuse any behavior, no matter how reprehensible, in order to preserve the ‘right’ of a 
mother to kill her children.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Will Johnston, A Proposal for a New Strategy Towards Abortion, VITAL 
SIGNS (Canadian Physicians for Life, Ontario, Can.), Fall 2002, at 1, available at 
http://www.physiciansforlife.ca/Fall%20’02.html (“[I]t is time to see that our society as a 
whole has become addicted to abortion.”). 
 46. Patrik Jonsson, South Carolina Tests the Bounds of a Fetus’s Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, June 28, 2001, at 1 (describing the history of fetal laws in America, and South 
Carolina’s fetal laws in particular). 
 47. Trapp, supra note 44. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Lynn Okamoto, House Passes Feticide Bill, DES MOINES REGISTER, Apr. 7, 2004, at 
1 (describing Iowa’s proposed legislation to provide for two victims, and noting that thirty-
one states have their own fetal homicide laws). 
 50. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997). 
 51. Id. at 779. 
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of the unborn, viable child as a person is accepted, we have no difficulty in 
holding that a cause of action for tortious injury to such a child arises 
immediately upon the infliction of the injury.”52  The Whitner court cited 
earlier cases in which third parties committed feticide, such as State v. 
Horne, where a husband stabbed his wife to death and a full-term fetus died 
in her womb from suffocation.53
The Whitner Court granted fetuses the status of persons, tendentiously 
explaining, “[w]e do not believe that the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
word ‘person’ has changed in any way that would now deny viable fetuses 
status as persons.”
  The ostensible reason for creating “two 
litigants” was to address the lack of redress in wrongful death fetal 
homicide cases. 
54  Dissenting Justice Moore chastised his colleagues for 
their “course of judicial activism rejected by every other court to address 
the issue.”55  Justice Moore argued against the majority’s strained assertion 
that a viable fetus is a child.56  He noted that greater inequities result from 
the majority’s argument for “equal treatment of viable fetuses and 
children.”57  In particular, pregnant women would be immune from 
prosecution if they quit using cocaine pre-viability, and pregnant women 
who have illegal abortions only get two-year sentences for killing a viable 
fetus.58  He noted that if Whitner, whose son was healthy, had instead 
legally aborted, she would have been better off in terms of sentencing.59
The amicus brief in McKnight was filed by organizations committed to a 
harm-reduction drug policy.
 
60  Careful not to endorse non-medical use of 
drugs during pregnancy by either parent, these organizations sought to use 
scientific consensus on the effects of prenatal ingestion of cocaine to 
McKnight’s advantage.61
 
 52. Id. at 780 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42, 44 
(S.C. 1964)). 
  Arguing that the prosecution was “devoid of 
 53. See State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984). 
 54. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 780. 
 55. Id. at 787 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. at 787-88 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 788 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See generally Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, Regina McKnight 
Submitted By South Carolina Medical Ass’n et al., McKnight v. S.C., 540 U.S. 819 (2003) 
(No. 02-1741), 2003 WL 22428153 [hereinafter Brief in Support of McKnight].  The amicus 
brief was submitted by the South Carolina Medical Association; South Carolina Association 
of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Counselors; American Nurses Association; National 
Association of Social Workers; Association of Maternal and Child Health Programs; and 
Institute For Health and Recovery. 
 61. Id. at 2-3. 
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scientific underpinning,” they mobilized science to show that the evidence 
could not plausibly suggest, much less prove, causation of stillbirth.62  
While medical evidence does not “indicate that cocaine is entirely benign 
for mother and fetus,” the risks “fall far short of the misconception of 
extreme harm typified by the ‘crack baby’ myth.”63  The brief writers then 
cited evidence on the prevalence of stillbirth, its various causes, and the 
lack of certainty concerning causation (a full ten percent of stillbirths go 
unexplained).64  Indeed, they noted that poverty, homelessness, 
malnutrition, and the stress associated with them could exacerbate known 
causes of stillbirths.65  They referred to the prosecution’s insistence that 
cocaine ingestion caused McKnight’s stillbirth as an “inferential leap.”66  
The State’s testifying pathologists inferred causality from the simple 
coexistence of cocaine metabolites and stillbirth.67  The amici argued that 
“[s]uch an inference does not withstand scientific scrutiny.”68  They 
contended that the pathologists failed to consider far more common reasons 
for fetal demise, many of which may have impacted McKnight.69  The 
amici documented confusion among treatment providers and their clients as 
to how mandatory reporting laws were supposed to work, indicating that 
there are ongoing debates over whether mandatory reporting laws deter 
women from seeking prenatal and obstetrical care.70  Finally, the amici 
contended that the court would “vitiate the longstanding recognition by the 
courts and the medical community that addiction is a disease, not a crime” 
if it upheld McKnight’s conviction.71
The unstable legal status of addiction—that is, our decision to respond to 
it as both crime and disease, but more a crime for some and a disease for 
others—contributes to the uncertainty of what rights and whose rights 
should be upheld in cases where fetal rights clash with maternal rights.  
Although the McKnight amici identified the “longstanding recognition . . . 
that addiction is a disease, and not a crime” it did not acknowledge that 
 
 
 62. Id. at 2. 
 63. Id. at 3. 
 64. Id. at 4. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 5. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 2-3; see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 n.8 (1962) (noting that 
in 1925, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that “persons addicted to narcotics ‘are 
diseased and proper subjects for (medical) treatment’”) (quoting Lindner v. United States, 
268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925)). 
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some “diseases” retain the moral character of a voluntaristic act.72  
Historians have identified the pervasive construction of alcoholism and 
drug addiction as inexorably powerful “diseases of the will.”73
Feminist legal scholars see the matter differently, for they have 
embraced policies that “recognize[] that women who bear children share 
the government’s objective of promoting healthy births.”
  The 
characterization of drug use as intentional or voluntary is commonly 
expressed by those who believe that criminalization is a useful response to 
drug use by pregnant and parenting women. 
74  Women’s 
rights advocate Dawn Johnsen refers to this as the “facilitative model,” 
because it facilitates women’s choices.75  Johnsen describes an alternate 
approach, called the “adversarial model,” which is characterized by 
attempts to “impose special restrictions and duties on women solely 
because they are or may become pregnant.”76  Johnsen disapproves of the 
adversarial model, arguing that, “[s]ubjecting women to special restrictions 
because of their childbearing capability interferes with rights the 
Constitution recognizes as so fundamental to individual liberty that they 
may be restricted by the government only under the most compelling 
circumstances.  Adversarial policies must therefore satisfy the demanding 
strict scrutiny standard of judicial review.”77  Without the protection of the 
strict scrutiny standard, Johnsen argued there would be “no logical stopping 
point to the kinds of personal decisions by women that could be second-
guessed by zealous prosecutors, estranged husbands and former lovers, or 
judges scrutinizing an isolated decision with the benefit of hindsight.”78
There are several dangers of using pregnancy outcomes in the 
adversarial context.  Such outcomes create an inherent conflict between 
promoting healthy births and protecting women’s fundamental liberties.
 
79
 
 72. Brief in Support of McKnight, supra note 
  
Additionally, they over-scrutinize women’s behavior while obscuring the 
60, at 2-3. 
 73. See generally MARIANA VALVERDE, DISEASES OF THE WILL: ALCOHOL AND THE 
DILEMMAS OF FREEDOM (1998). 
 74. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without 
Sacrificing Women’s Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 571 (1992). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  The adversarial model views “the woman and the fetus she carries as distinct 
legal entities having adverse interests, and assume[s] that the government’s role is to protect 
the fetus from the woman.”  Id. 
 77. Id. at 581.  Johnsen finds that “[u]sing adversarial approached to the problem of 
drug use during pregnancy when alternative facilitative approaches exist” is both “bad 
policy” and “a basis for finding such policies unconstitutional.”  Id. at 606. 
 78. Id. at 586. 
 79. Id. at 613. 
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behavior of men.80  Finally, the use of pregnancy outcomes is 
counterproductive; it deters the very behaviors that contribute to healthy 
births.81
CONTEXTUALIZING THE CLASH BETWEEN CONDITIONAL RIGHTS AND 
UNCONDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
Fueled by the crack-cocaine crisis of the late 1980s, the War on Drugs 
became a “war on women.”82  It sharply increased the number of women 
under the control of the criminal justice system, especially due to random 
drug testing of parolees.83  Feminist sociologists and historians who study 
women as criminal perpetrators argue that women’s offenses must be 
contextualized84 within the circumstances of trauma that derive from living 
in contexts of “structural violence.”85  They return us to a few simple 
questions: Whose rights are at stake? What privacy and other protections 
are accorded to the vulnerable?  How will benefits, burdens, or the basic 
autonomy required to discharge one’s obligations and responsibilities be 
distributed?  What are the terms and conditions of the social contract(s) by 
which we abide, and do these terms and conditions differ for the poor, for 
those who are entangled in structural constraints? What happens to those 
whose circumstances prevent them from exercising their rights or 
discharging their duties?  As I have argued elsewhere, “[w]omen’s rights as 
persons are made conditional—rights are purchased by [some] women’s 
good behavior as mothers and forfeited in the case of bad behavior [by 
other women].”86
This conditionality is based on a false antithesis between the rights of 
women as persons and the obligations of women as mothers which was 
created by the fetal rights campaign.  I refer to this as the “irreconcilable 
differences model,” contending that such a framework presents practical, 
legal, and political problems of an irresolvable nature.  Although fetal 
rights proponents restage this false antithesis, it is not limited to the fetal 
rights debate. Since suffrage, according to historian Linda Gordon, “[t]he 
 
 
 80. See id. at 607-08 (noting cases in which “men and women are similarly situated, yet 
government action singles out only women for penalties and restrictions”). 
 81. Id. at 589. 
 82. MEDA CHESNEY-LIND, THE FEMALE OFFENDER: GIRLS, WOMEN, AND CRIME 99 
(1997). 
 83. Id. at 147. 
 84. Id. at 142-43. 
 85. See generally PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, 
AND THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR (2003).  Farmer uses the term “structural violence” as “a 
broad rubric that includes a host of offensives against human dignity.”  Id. at 8. 
 86. CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN, supra note 11, at 188. 
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problem [has been] that the mother-child separation occurred not in a 
feminist discourse that would have validated women’s needs and the work 
of parenting, but in a discourse that treated children, quite unrealistically, 
alone, as a group with a unique claim on the state.”87
Fetal rights proponents defend fetuses in ways that render women’s 
rights conditional.
  That specious split 
has now been extended through the attempted institutionalization of an 
even less realistic discourse that treats fetuses as a group with a uniquely 
compelling claim upon the state apart from the women whose bodies 
sustain them. 
88
the burden on the woman is to stop using illegal drugs once she has 
exercised her constitutional decision not to have an abortion. . . .  Once 
the mother has made the choice to have a child, she must accept the 
consequence of that choice. One of the consequences of having children is 
that it creates certain duties and obligations to that child. If a woman does 
not fulfill those obligations, then the state must step in to prevent harm to 
the child.
  Their approach ensures that women continue to 
shoulder the burdens of biosocial reproduction: 
89
Attempts to gain criminal liability for fetal endangerment are in part 
about social reproduction.  This point was illustrated in a 1990 Criminal 
Justice Ethics symposium in which Phillip Johnson lamented the “ACLU 
philosophy” in the face of the “crack mother prosecutions” that reveal a 
nation “desperately” trying to slow the “alarming disappearance of personal 
and family norms.”
 
90  According to Johnson,  “[t]he great-grandparents of 
today’s crack mothers and absent fathers had a religious morality that 
enabled them in most cases to provide an admirable family life during the 
Great Depression, when poverty and discrimination were everywhere and 
no one imagined that child care was the federal government’s business.”91  
Johnson’s historical analysis suggests that fetal rights proponents have a 
moral agenda to counter the “license for self-indulgence” that has taken 
hold as individuals “have come to think of themselves as rights-bearing and 
pleasure-seeking individuals.”92
 
 87. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF 
WELFARE 1890-1935, at 100 (1994). 
  That a “license for self-indulgence” 
 88. Sam S. Balisy, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection 
for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1220-21 (1987). 
 89. Nova D. Janssen, Fetal Rights and the Prosecution of Women for Using Drugs 
During Pregnancy, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 741, 762 (2000). 
 90. Phillip E. Johnson, The ACLU Philosophy and the Right to Abuse the Unborn, 9 
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 48, 51 (1990). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 49. 
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should be withheld from the poor will not come as a surprise to those 
familiar with both the multiple indignities to which the poor are subjected 
and the recent trend toward conditioning public aid on good behavior.93
Drug-using women are vulnerable due to social-structural circumstances 
beyond their control.  Additionally, a symbolic vengeance has been exacted 
through the enforcement of laws and policies targeted at poor, pregnant, 
drug-using women, most of whom are African-American.  Although 
punitive efforts have been highly localized—most of the cases have come 
from South Carolina
 
94—the issues at their core transcend the local 
circumstances of specific cases.  They are not merely about biological 
reproduction, but about women’s over-responsibility for the difficult labors 
of social reproduction and lack of public support for the exercise of 
reproductive rights and decisions.  How many women in McKnight’s or 
Whitner’s situation—burdened by a lifetime of abuse and bound by the 
structures of constraint specific to their race, class, and gender95—can be 
said to make clear, constitutional decisions to have children?  Not only 
have courts and legislatures everywhere declined to support poor women’s 
autonomy in reproductive decision-making,96 they also have burdened the 
path of even highly enfranchised women exercising reproductive choice.97
The displacement of rights from women to the fetus was the anti-
abortion movement’s response to the framing of abortion as women’s right 
to choose.
  
The drug and pregnancy debate only makes sense when located in the 
geography of social inequality. 
98  First-generation feminist characterizations of women’s 
reproductive autonomy set up women’s rights to conflict with those of the 
fetuses they were carrying.  The earliest “fetal rights” cases, assembled by 
Janet Gallagher after a pattern emerged in 1982, involved compelled 
Cesarean sections.99
 
 93. See SANFORD F. SCHRAM, AFTER WELFARE: THE CULTURE OF POSTINDUSTRIAL 
SOCIAL POLICY 168-69 (2000). 
  In particular, advocates for pregnant women were 
 94. See Dana Page, Note, The Homicide by Child Abuse Conviction of Regina 
McKnight, 46 HOW. L.J. 363, 370 (2003). 
 95. See id. at 365-69 (describing the abusive conditions of McKnight’s life). 
 96. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 29, at 25. 
 97. See SUSAN M. BEHUNIAK, A CARING JURISPRUDENCE: LISTENING TO PATIENTS AT THE 
SUPREME COURT 62-63 (1999) (examining a series of abortion cases and concluding that the 
courts disregarded the patients’ knowledge and instead focused almost exclusively on 
medical knowledge). 
 98. See CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING 
SOCIAL CHANGE (1990). 
 99. See, e.g., Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What’s Wrong with 
Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 11 (1987) (“The most dramatic and highly 
publicized claims of ‘fetal rights’ have been made in the context of coerced Caesarean 
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galvanized by the plight of Angela Carder.100  Georgetown Hospital, acting 
under court authorization, forced Mrs. Carder, a young, terminally ill 
woman, to undergo a C-section against her wishes, as well as those of her 
husband, her parents, and her physicians.101  Both Mrs. Carder and the 
fetus died as a result of that C-section.102  This case made apparent the 
limitations of the rhetoric of “choice,” clearing the way for advocacy on 
behalf of pregnant women to become somewhat separate from mainstream 
advocacy for reproductive rights.  This differentiation occurred even as 
fetal rights proponents sought to construct laws favorable to their anti-
abortion position.103  Thus the limitations of the rhetoric of choice were not 
simply symbolic—they opened the door to criminalization not only of 
abortion but of stillbirth or the presence of drug metabolites by making it 
appear that all behaviors during pregnancy are intentional and that fairly 
arcane and unproven matters of clinical practice are “common 
knowledge.”104
Trying to shift away from the individualist rhetoric of the pro-choice 
movement, a small network of feminist reproductive rights advocates that 
initially worked out of the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project argued 
that pregnant women and fetuses share an interest in healthy births.
 
105  
They ran up against the mainstream of women’s policy research and 
reproductive rights advocacy organizations, which had become 
sophisticated users and defenders of the “dominant language of liberal 
individualism”106
 
sections.”). 
 to prevent their marginalization and dissolution during 
the 1980s; “[m]ost of the organizations that did survive the 1980s 
maintained their credibility while keeping feminist claims—for women’s 
economic rights, overcoming violence and sexual assault against women, 
 100. See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 1, at 42; Terry E. Thornton & Lynn Paltrow, The 
Rights of Pregnant Patients: Carder Case Brings Bold Policy Initiatives, 8 HEALTHSPAN 10 
(1991), available at http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/articles/angela.htm. 
 101. DANIELS, supra note 1, at 31-32. 
 102. Id. at 32.  The Carder family sued the hospital for violating Angela Carder’s civil 
rights.  Id.  The U.S. Court of Appeals upheld Mrs. Carder’s rights and argued that the lower 
court “erred in subordinating [Angela Carder’s] right to bodily integrity in favor of the 
state’s interest in potential life.”  In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 103. See CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN, supra note 14, at 182 (describing how “choice” is a 
“flexible term that triggers an emphasis on moral accountability”). 
 104. For a discussion of the epistemological underpinnings of “common knowledge,” see 
generally MARIANA VALVERDE, LAW’S DREAM OF A COMMON KNOWLEDGE (2003). 
 105. See generally Johnsen, supra note 74. 
 106. Roberta Spalter-Roth & Ronnee Schreiber, Outsider Issues and Insider Tactics: 
Strategic Tensions in the Women’s Policy Network During the 1980s, in FEMINIST 
ORGANIZATIONS: HARVEST OF THE NEW WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 105, 115-17 (Myra Marx 
Ferree & Partricia Yancey Martin eds., 1995). 
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abortion rights, civil rights, and political empowerment—on the policy 
agenda, albeit not always in their purest form.”107  Such liberal 
individualist rights talk bolstered the credibility of women who could 
conform to prevailing notions of gender-neutral equality, self-discipline, 
and good conduct at the expense of those who could not.  Choice was a 
discursive political trap that led the liberal reproductive rights movement to 
be painted as “anti-fetal rights.”108
Rights talk makes it seem as if women deliberately take illegal drugs in 
order to harm fetuses, which plays into the hands of fetal rights proponents.  
Claims of intentionality should rest on proof that a woman knows the 
extent to which cocaine harms her fetus.  In McKnight, however, the court 
only found proof of extreme indifference because McKnight, like Whitner, 
supposedly possessed common knowledge about the effects of cocaine: 
 
although the precise effects of maternal crack use during pregnancy are 
somewhat unclear, it is well documented and within the realm of public 
knowledge that such use can cause serious harm to the viable unborn 
child.  Given this common knowledge, Whitner was on notice that her 
conduct in utilizing cocaine during pregnancy constituted child 
endangerment.109
The court concluded that “the fact that McKnight took cocaine knowing 
she was pregnant was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury on whether 
she acted with extreme indifference to her child’s life.”
 
110  Given the 
gravity of the charge, the court should have based its conclusion that 
McKnight acted with extreme indifference on something other  than the 
following assertion that Judge Toal made twelve years prior in another 
case: “The drug ‘cocaine’ has torn at the very fabric of our nation. Families 
have been ripped apart, minds have been ruined, and lives have been lost.  
It is common knowledge that the drug is highly addictive and potentially 
fatal.”111  This quotation, along with some circumstantial evidence from a 
Department of Social Services (DSS) investigator who testified that 
McKnight knew she was pregnant and used cocaine, served as the only 
evidence of McKnight’s criminal intent.112
The science of in utero cocaine exposure has not been unequivocal.  
 
 
 107. Id. at 125. 
 108. See RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE POLITICS OF CHOICE 
SHAPES ADOPTION, ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 220-24 (2001) 
(providing a thorough critique of the idiom of “choice”). 
 109. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 173 (S.C. 2003). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. (quoting State v. Major, 391 S.E.2d 235, 237 (S.C. 1990)). 
 112. Id. 
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Researchers and medical organizations including the American Medical 
Association have expressed concerns that their “rush to judgment” in the 
early days of the crack-cocaine scare was harmful to children.113  
Investigators have since documented few differences between children 
from similar social and economic circumstances who are exposed to 
cocaine in utero versus those who are not.114  The amicus briefs in 
McKnight offered far more scientific evidence that cocaine use did not 
negatively affect pregnancy than the prosecution offered to support its 
contrary assertions.115  Current studies show that in utero cocaine exposure 
is about as harmful as tobacco exposure—and less harmful than heavy 
alcohol exposure.116
POLICY ENTREPRENEURS AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISTS 
  But these studies did not accord with the governing 
mentalities of the court, which disregarded them.  In fact, Whitner and 
McKnight did not suffer the two most problematic complications of in vitro 
cocaine exposure—ruptured membranes and placental abruption.  What 
then was going on in South Carolina? 
Prosecutors dictate whether and how a drugs-and-pregnancy case will be 
brought.  Legal sociologist Laura Gómez has found that local prosecutors, 
who typically used “crack baby” terminology, embraced two extreme, 
polarized strategies: one very punitive, revealing an obvious intent to 
punish, and the other a strategy of inaction.117  Johnson v. State 
demonstrates an extremely punitive strategy that ultimately failed when 
Johnson’s conviction was overturned by the Florida Supreme Court.118
 
 113. L.C. Maynes et al., The Problem of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Rush to 
Judgment, 267 JAMA 406, 406 (1992). 
  A 
paucity of cases fell into the middle range of Gómez’s continuum—
“moderately punitive” diversion that coerced women into treatment and 
 114. Deborah A., Frank et al., Growth, Development, and Behavior in Early Childhood 
Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Systematic Review, 285 JAMA 1613, 1621-24 
(2001) (“[A]mong children up to 6 years of age, there is no convincing evidence that 
prenatal cocaine exposure is associated with any developmental toxicity different in severity 
of age, scope, or kind from the sequelae of many other risk factors [including tobacco, 
marijuana, alcohol, or the quality of the child’s environment].”). 
 115. See Brief in Support of McKnight, supra note 60, at 3-24; see also supra notes 60-
71 and accompanying text (describing the scientific evidence in the McKnight brief). 
 116. See Brief in Support of McKnight, supra note 60, at 15-16. 
 117. GÓMEZ, supra note 8, at 74, 78. 
 118. 602 So. 2d 1288, 1296 (Fla. 1992) (holding that the prosecution of pregnant women 
who engage in activities that are harmful to the fetus is inappropriate and against public 
interest); see also GÓMEZ, supra note 8, at 79.  For more information on the Johnson case, 
see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
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softer, less punitive diversion.119  In Ferguson v. City of Charleston120 
there was a potent synergy between the elements of extremely punitive 
prosecutorial behavior, legal coercions, and moral fervor.121  Charles 
Condon, the publicly outspoken anti-abortion prosecutor in that case, 
helped set up the “rights talk” version of the debate: “[y]ou have the right 
to an abortion.  You have the right to have a baby.  You don’t have the 
right to have a baby deformed by cocaine.”122
It strains belief for Whitner to argue that using crack cocaine during 
pregnancy is encompassed within the constitutionally recognized right of 
privacy. Use of crack cocaine is illegal, period.  No one here argues that 
laws criminalizing the use of crack cocaine are themselves 
unconstitutional.  If the State wishes to impose additional criminal 
penalties on pregnant women who engage in this already illegal conduct 
because of the effect the conduct has on the viable fetus, it may do so.  
We do not see how the fact of pregnancy elevates the use of crack cocaine 
to the lofty status of a fundamental right.
  As the State Supreme Court 
wrote in Whitner and quoted in McKnight: 
123
The argument that reproductive rights advocates promote the use of 
crack cocaine by pregnant women or construct it as a fundamental right is 
belied by McKnight’s amicus briefs.
 
124  But the tendentious claim serves 
the symbolic value of tarring reproductive rights advocates with the brush 
of condoning drug use and rendering their cause absurd or malicious.  This 
disdainful tone pervaded the McKnight Court’s dismissal of the defense’s 
fears that reproductive rights were being rolled back, or that women would 
be deterred from seeking medical help. The court remarked in a footnote 
that, “[a]s did Whitner, McKnight forebodes a parade of horribles and 
points to commentators who object to the prosecution of pregnant women 
as being contrary to public policy and deterring women from seeking 
appropriate medical care and/or creating incentives for women to seek 
abortions to avoid prosecution.” 125
 
 119. See GÓMEZ, supra note 
  The court dismissed the legitimate 
concerns that therapeutic relationships would be jeopardized and 
fundamental trust between women and medical professionals would be 
8, at 78-79; see also CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN, supra note 
11, at 189. 
 120. 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 121. See generally id. 
 122. GÓMEZ, supra note 8, at 79.  Condon later became the South Carolina Attorney 
General.  Id. 
 123. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 176-77 (S.C. 2003) (quoting Whitner v. State, 
492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (S.C. 1997)). 
 124. See generally Brief in Support of McKnight, supra note 60. 
 125. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 175 n.5. 
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eroded.126
When advocates struggled against punitive policies directed toward 
pregnant women who use drugs, their issue fell between the cracks of the 
feminist reproductive rights movement, the civil rights movement, the 
women’s health movement, and the drug policy reform movement.
  The strategy of fetal rights law and policy entrepreneurs has 
been to paint feminist advocates as paranoid projectors of a “parade of 
horribles” out of misguided concerns for public health and social justice. 
127  
Lynn Paltrow argues that “[t]hose who are concerned about fundamental 
issues of social justice may be losing ground, missing opportunities to build 
coalitions and strengthen arguments by failing to recognize the similarities 
among and relationships between the [drug policy and reproductive rights] 
issues.”128  Fetal rights claims tend to undermine coalitions for health care, 
disability rights, environment, drug policy, prison reform efforts, even 
immigrant health care rights.  Yet, fetal rights proponents use drug policy 
to justify limiting (some) women’s rights in ways that will ultimately 
retract (all) women’s rights.  Neoconservatives use a wide and almost 
bewildering range of policy arenas ranging from welfare reform to crime 
control to gain an advantage in reproductive rights debates.  Nowhere have 
they been quite so successful as within the illicit drug policy arena—and 
nowhere quite so successful as in South Carolina.129
The policy design literature implicates the production of “target 
populations” within what Anne Larason Schneider and Helen Ingram call 
“degenerative politics.”
  Drug policy has been 
especially useful to this neoconservative project because the scourge of 
drugs separates some (especially bad) women out from (mostly good) 
women without much dissent from either.  To the extent that feminists buy 
into the idea of splitting off “good” women from “bad,” our coalitions will 
be undermined. 
130  The term “degenerative politics” refers to issue 
contexts where divisions between “target populations” that are deserving 
and undeserving, worthy and unworthy, are deeply inscribed.131
 
 126. See Brief in Support of McKnight, supra note 
  Schneider 
and Ingram identify four different policy targets: (i) the already 
advantaged; (ii) groups of “contenders,” who are often negatively 
60, at 25. 
 127. I want to acknowledge the inspiration of Lynn Paltrow and her organization, 
National Advocates for Pregnant Women (NAPW), for building a national response network 
and working on all fronts to defend pregnant women charged with criminal acts. 
 128. Paltrow, The War on Drugs and the War on Abortion, supra note 17, at 201-02. 
 129. For a discussion of the policies South Carolina employed, see ELLEN ALDERMAN & 
CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 123 (1995). 
 130. ANNE LARASON SCHNEIDER & HELEN INGRAM, POLICY DESIGN FOR DEMOCRACY 102 
(1997). 
 131. Id. 
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constructed as undeserving, greedy, or willing to deal behind closed doors 
because they have some power; (iii) dependents, constructed as deserving if 
needy and helpless; and (iv) deviants, who are negatively constructed as 
undeserving.132  According to Schneider and Ingram’s calculus, policy-
makers gain similar benefits by punishing deviant groups as they do by 
rewarding advantaged groups.133  Due to the political appeal of symbolic 
vengeance in such arenas,134  policies of incarceration, coercion, or unduly 
intensive surveillance may be oversubscribed or used inappropriately.135
Reproductive rights movements run into predictable trouble according to 
Schneider’s and Ingram’s typology.
  
While pluralists assume that there will be self-corrective mechanisms, they 
are unlikely to prevail in such “degenerative” issue contexts. 
136
Women were largely invisible within the nation’s drug policy until the 
late 1980s crack-cocaine epidemic brought the “decline of maternal 
instinct” to the national stage.
  Their “target populations” cross all 
groups—social policies must simultaneously represent highly advantaged 
groups, as well as less advantaged groups of contenders, dependents, and 
deviants.  As such, they run into internal contradictions as well as external 
contention over the allocation of rights, resources, obligations, and burdens.  
The perennial accusation that the “white” reproductive rights movement is 
insufficiently attentive to low-income women and women of color has been 
belied by the second and third generation reproductive rights organizations 
that focus specifically on them.  Advocates of drug-using women have built 
a social movement that does not support the distinction between “good” 
and “bad” actors.  Instead, they have sought unconditional rights and a 
facilitative relationship between women and the state, as well as seeking to 
move the drugs-and-pregnancy debate outside the “degenerative” issue 
context of the adversarial model and the anti-abortion movement. 
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 132. Id. 
 Prior to that, it was hard for women’s 
health advocates to draw attention to the issue. During the crack-cocaine 
 133. Id. at 120-22. 
 134. See id. at 120 (“[G]overnments are especially likely to shift toward a politics of 
punishment as a means of displacing blame onto others and creating opportunities for 
political gain.”). 
 135. See id. (“Some powerless groups offer easy scapegoats for societal problems . . . . 
Providing punishments to persons constructed as deviants yields little or no resistance as 
these groups have essentially no political power, and the actions are generally applauded by 
the broader public because they believe deviants deserve to be punished.”). 
 136. See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text for a description of Schneider’s and 
Ingram’s typology. 
 137. CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN, supra note 11, at 170; see Campbell, Regulating 
“Maternal Instinct”, supra note 9, at 895 (“Policymakers announced the erosion of 
‘maternal instincts’ in the thick of the crack cocaine crisis of the late 1980’s.”). 
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scare, and well into the 1990s as the scare abated, many states debated 
policies to target using women.138  While “no-pregnancy” conditions had 
been struck down as “impermissively overbroad,”139 there have been drug-
related cases in which lower courts have required women to choose 
sterilization or jail.140
What messages will pregnant women get regarding their constitutional 
protections?  Will pregnant women be forced to forego the protections of 
informed consent, irregardless of their circumstances?  Should we allow 
women’s rights to self-sovereignty, freedom from government intrusion, 
and right to bodily integrity to be questioned?  If so, when, on what 
grounds, and at what cost?  Daniels argues that even a single case where a 
pregnant woman is forced to undergo medical treatment that anyone else 
would not be forced to undergo chips away at all women’s rights to self-
sovereignty: “[w]omen face a risk of social coercion never faced by men 
simply because of women’s ability to carry a fetus to term.”
  For the most part, however, legislatures and courts 
have determined that there are much better ways to protect the public and 
prevent injury to future children than criminal prosecution of pregnant 
women.  On purely instrumental grounds, specific criminalization fails to 
achieve our goals of healthy births, drug-free pregnancies, adequate 
prenatal and postpartum care, or adequate support for already-born 
children.  So what were these prosecutions about?  If we allow prosecutions 
to become symbolic policy, the unfortunate individual outcome of a cycle 
in which we as a society seek retribution against women who transgress, 
we ignore that these are among the most vulnerable of women.  We ignore 
that women are far from the majority of drug users and abusers, and that 
pregnant women are a very small subset of addicted persons. 
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 138. ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 
  This gender 
differential derives from socially assigned roles in social reproduction, and 
the preoccupation with some women’s failure to meet theirs.  If drug policy 
can be read as a form of cultural production, then we may ask what our 
treatment of drug-using women tells us about what women are supposed to 
be and do in our political culture. 
129, at 121-23 (explaining Florida’s attempt to 
prosecute a woman for ingesting crack during labor, Connecticut’s attempt to deprive a 
woman who used cocaine after her water broke of parental rights, and South Carolina’s 
testing of pregnant women for illegal drug use). 
 139. Id. at 125 (citing People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 269 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
 140. See, e.g., Sheila C. Cummings, Is Crack the Cure?, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 1, 5 (2003) 
(discussing the monetary incentives that “Project Prevention,” a private organization, offers 
to encourage addicted men and women to undergo sterilization); Jim Persels, The Norplant 
Condition: Protecting the Unborn or Violating Fundamental Rights?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 237 
(1992) (discussing the constitutionality of forced sterilization by states). 
 141. DANIELS, supra note 1, at 53. 
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